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We need only look at the world around us to observe that healthy minds
linked with disabled bodies can accomplish much, while sick minds in
the strongest of physical structures will contribute nothing to the wel-
fare of the individual or society.3
The above statement cannot be disputed by either the
medical or legal profession. Another unquestionable state-
ment is that "all emotional disturbance has a physical aspect
and all physical disturbance, an emotional aspect."' 2 These two
statements taken together seem to strongly indicate that dam-
ages for traumatic mental injuries caused by a tortfeasor
would be as recoverable as those of pure physical injury. How-
ever, a third uncontested statement has thrown this area of
damages into complete turmoil. This statement, although re-
plete with medico-legal implications, can be stated simply as
"there is no scientific proof whether emotional disturbance is
caused ultimately by physical events occurring in the nervous
system or by the psychological phenomena of thought, feeling
or behavior."3
With these statements hopelessly confused for some period
of time, it now seems that some courts have begun to under-
stand and properly categorize damages recoverable for emo-
tional distress caused by any form of traumatic event.
Throughout the evolution of the mental or emotional disturb-
ance cases, the courts have adopted many tests and theories
for allowing or disallowing recovery of damages. The two
most important of these tests have had significant impact on
the present status of the law. Section II of this paper will dis-
cuss what has been termed the "physical injury" or impact
test and Section III will deal with the second significant test,
which is the "zone of danger" test.
With a basic understanding of these two most influential
tests in mind, Section IV will discuss an important case law
trend which has begun to emerge. The South Carolina prog-
1. Mason v. Gray, Case No. 2254 (Koontenai County Ct. Idaho, Sept. 26,
1967).
2. 1 D. Sc HART2, TRAUMA: NEuRosEs FOLLOWING TPAUMA 32 (1959).
3. Id.
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ress in this area will be discussed in Section V. Section VI
will interpret the various suggested standards, and the prob-
lems arising therefrom, which have been proposed for a uni-
form and equitable view. In conclusion, Section VII will view
the possible future course of the courts in regard to this com-
plex mental and emotional recovery problem.
This broad overview of a changing and viable subject will
concentrate on the developments which have occurred where
the emotional distress is brought on by the plaintiff's obser-
vance of the accident. This situation has been litigated with
increasing frequency and shows the emerging trends clearly.
II. PHYSICAL INJURY OR IMPACT TEST
One area in which the recovery for emotional distress has
not encountered the many obstacles to be discussed later is
where the negligence inflicts some physical injury. The courts
reason that with a cause of action established by the physical
harm, parasitic damages are awarded, and it is considered
that there is sufficient assurance that the mental injury is not
feigned. 4 Or, stated another way, since distress of mind is
easily simulated, speculative, and difficult to disprove, the re-
quirement of a physical injury is a guaranty of the trust-
worthiness of the claim.5
There is still some dispute in this area with regard to the
immediacy of the physical injury which is required. When the
emotional distress complained of results in physical illness,
even though the negligence does not produce immediate physi-
cal injury, some courts allow recovery6 while others continue
to require immediate physical injury to recover.
7
The essential "impact" which has been required by the
majority of the courts has led to many absurd results and in-
consistencies. "In some states the most trivial physical injury
may serve as the foundation to base a claim for extraordinary
consequences, and conversely the most serious physical or
emotional consequences may go uncompensated because the
negligence which occasioned the fright did not also produce an
4. 1 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITy 460 (1906).
5. See Huston v. Borough of Freemansburg, 212 Pa. 548, 61 A. 1022
(1905) ; Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
6. See Padgett v. Colonial Wholesale Distrib. Co., 232 S.C. 593, 103
S.E.2d 265 (1958).
7. See Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A2d 263 (1958).
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immediate physical injury."8 A continuing problem with the
impact rule was the courts' fabrication and extension to find
the necessary impact. This has led many courts to find impact
in minor contacts which have had no part in causing the harm
sustained and have actually had no importance in themselves."
The necessity of finding impact in order to allow "para-
sitic" damages has often caused unjustifiably harsh results
when applied to the bystander situation. An example of this
result is found in an Indiana case ° which denied recovery for
the fright and emotional distress sustained by a mother who
watched her daughter being dragged along a railroad plat-
form by a train. The court stated that "the most reliable and
better-considered cases, as well as public policy, fully justify
us in holding that the plaintiff cannot recover for injuries oc-
casioned from fright, as there was no immediate personal in-
jury."'" Other examples are a New York case which refused
recovery to a mother who had also witnessed injury to her
child ;12 an Indiana case which disallowed recovery to a wife
who saw her husband being beaten;13 and, finally, an Ohio
case1 4 which denied recovery in a factual situation which ex-
emplifies the inequities of this test. In this case, the plaintiff's
sister was beaten to death by the defendant and the court
held "there can be no recovery for fright or shock, even when
sustained as the result of a willful act, unless such act was
directed toward the person or property of the one seeking re-
covery. Injuries to a third person cannot be the basis of re-
covery for shock or fright suffered by the complaintant."'' r
The best statement which accurately summarized the
problems presented by the impact test is as follows:
Inconsistently applied, the physical injury test has traditionally been
the device of appellate courts for deciding issues of fact. Consistently
applied, it is their tool for deciding questions of policy and limiting
8. Brody, Negligently Inflicted Psychic Injuries: A Return to Reason, 7
ViLL. L. REv. 232, 235 (1962).
9. See W. PRossFa, HANDBOOK OF TE LAW o TORTS 331 (4th ed. 1971).
10. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374, 56 N.E.
917 (1900).
11. Id. at 376, 56 N.E. at 920.
12. Blessington v. Autry, 105 N.Y.S.2d (Sup. Ct 1951).
13. Boden v. Del-Mar Garage, Inc., 205 Ind. 59, 185 N.E. 860 (1933).
14. Koontz v. Keller, 52 Ohio App. 265, 3 N.E.2d 694 (1936).
15. Id. at 266, 3 N.E.2d at 695.
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questions of fact. An argument can be made that they have done neither
well.' 0
This troublesome rule has recently been repudiated by the ma-
jority of the courts which have faced the issue. Prosser re-
ports that twenty-seven states have done away with the re-
quirement of impact and that all but four of these states have
taken this position since 1900.17
A recent New York case18 has revealed the many faults
of the impact rule and may have, in effect, done away with it.
With the problems derived from the impact test effectively
abandoned, the courts then had to review the other possible
alternatives. One such alternative is known as the zone of
danger test.
III. ZONE OF DANGER TEST
The physical injury or impact test was replaced with a
test which would allow recovery for traumatic mental injuries
which were proximately caused and foreseeable by a defen-
dant, if the plaintiff was within the "zone of danger." What
this test does in effect is to allow damages for plaintiff's per-
sonal fear for his own safety and not simply his fear for an-
other.
The leading case in this area is Orlo v. Connecticut Co.'19,
which presented this view long before the down-fall of the
impact test. The Or/o court stated that its
... conclusion is that where it is proven that negligence proximately
caused fright or shock in one who is within the range of ordinary phy-
sical danger from that negligence, and this in turn produced injuries
such as would be elements of damage had a bodily injury been suffered,
the injured party is entitled to recover.
20
In this case, there was no physical injury from impact, but
the court allowed recovery simply because the plaintiff was
within what he actually believed to be a "zone of danger."
A second leading case, Mahnke v. Moore2' decided ten
years after Orlo, allowed plaintiff's recovery for traumatic
16. Supra note 8 at 238.
17. Supra note 9 at 332.
18. Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 219 N.Y.S2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 729
(1961). This case will be discussed in more detail in Section IV of this note.
19. 1281 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941).
20. Id: 'at 234, 21 A.2d at 405.
21. 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951).,
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mental injuries suffered during the commission of a murder-
suicide in his presence. The court in so holding stated that:
a plaintiff can sustain an action for damages for nervous shock or in-
jury caused without physical impact, by fright arising directly from
defendant's negligent act or omission, and resulting in some clearly
apparent and substantial physical injury as manifested by an external
condition or by symptoms clearly indicative of a resultant pathological,
physiological, or mental state.
2 2
In regard to the effect of the zone of danger test on the
bystander, the courts have again had difficulty in applying
this standard properly. The Maryland case of Resavage v.
Davies,23 decided one year after Machnke, held that a by-
stander, the mother of the injured party, could not recover be-
cause defendant's duty did not extend to a party in safety.
One commentator has stated that:
[I]f there is to be no recovery for witnessing harm to a third person,
it ought to make no difference at all whether the witness is in a place
of safety or within the zone of danger. In this respect, the Maryland
decision in the Resavage case represents a misapplication of the "zone
of danger" test, for there the test was used as a mechanical device
which obscured the real issues of liability or nonliability.
2 4
Therefore, it seems that the zone of danger test has func-
tioned more as a rejection of the physical injury or impact test
than as a solution to the bystander problem. It would seem
that few cases would arise placing a bystander in such a posi-
tion that he fears so greatly for his own safetly as to allow him
recovery. This being true, it becomes more important that the
court seek a solution which can be administered not as a mech-
anical test, but one that is flexible enough to fit various fact-
ual situations. Such a solution may be emerging in a new case
law trend.
IV. EMERGING CASE LAW TREND
The general rule of denying recovery for the mental dis-
turbance suffered by the bystander is best stated in the leading
case of Waiube v. Warrington.25 This rule can be summarized
as follows:
22. Id. at 65, 77 A.2d at 927.
23. 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952).
24. Supra note 8 at 239.
25. 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W., 497 (1935).
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[N]o recovery is permitted for a mental or emotional disturbance, or
for a bodily injury or illness resulting therefrom, in the absence of a
contemporaneous bodily contact or independent cause of action, or an
element of wilfulness, wantonness, or maliciousness, in cases in which
there is no injury other than one to a third person, even though re-
covery would have been permitted had the wrong been directed against
the plaintiff. The rule is frequently applied to mental or emotional dis-
turbances caused by another's suffering. It has been regarded as ap-
plicable to mental or emotional disturbance resulting from an injury
not only to a stranger, but also to a relative of the plaintiff, such as a
child, sister, father, or spouse.2 6
Against this strong background in which the courts find no
duty to the bystander, few courts have tried to view each case
upon its facts. The two tests, "physical contact" and "zone of
danger", have also failed to amicably handle each claim as it
has arisen.
The first court which attempted to challenge the absolute
no recovery doctrine was BattalUl v. State2 7 decided in 1961.
Although this ease did not involve a bystander situation, it
took a major step by overruling the no recovery doctrine as
presented in Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Co. 2 1 The Battalla
court stated in regard to total disallowance of damages for
traumatic mental injuries, that:
even the public policy argument is subject to challenge. Although
fraud, extra litigation, and a measure of speculation are, of course,
possibilities, it is no reason for a court to eschew a measure of its
jurisdiction. 'The argument from mere expediency cannot commend
itself to a Court of Justice, resulting in the denial of a logical legal
right and remedy in all cases because in some a fictitious injury may be
urged as a real one.
2 9
The California courts, which have been the leaders of the
new trend, accepted the Waube rationale as late as 1963 in the
case of Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel and Supply Co.30 This case
was an action by a mother who suffered fright and nervous
shock when she viewed her 17-month-old child being run over
by the defendant's truck. Nevertheless, Justice Peter's dissent
in Amaya presents the total argument for a more flexible de-
26. 52 Air. JuR. Torts §70 (1944).
27. Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 729
(1961).
28. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
29. 10 N.Y.2d 237, 240, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 37, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731 (1961).
30. 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 379 P.2d 513 (1963).
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cision. This dissent, which is highly regarded by the scholars,
quotes Dean Prosser by stating:
It is not consonant with the reactions, or the mores, of the society of
today to hold that the mother who suffers emotional distress upon the
sight of her child's injury should not recover if the trier of fact finds
such injury was reasonably foreseeable. The knowledge of potential
emotional trauma to a parent who witnesses an injury to a child is too
clear to the negligent driver to permit an escape upon the ground of
unforeseeability.
31
Just six years later, the California Supreme Court was
again faced with almost the identical factual situation as that
presented in Amaya. This case, Dillon v. Legg,3 2 overruled
Amaya and allowed the plaintiff-mother recovery for mental
injury caused by the trauma of witnessing her daughter's
death in an automobile collision. The Dillon court, in reject-
ing the zone of danger test because of its total arbitrariness,
simply recognized the "natural justice upon which the mother's
claim rests."33 As one commentator has stated:
The court, feeling that duty was inherently intertwined with foresee-
ability, established a list of factors which should be taken into account
in determining the scope of duty where the plaintiff was a witness to
an act of negligence involving another. The three factors to be con-
sidered were the relation between the plaintiff and the victim, the near-
ness of the plaintiff to the accident, and the circumstances under which
knowledge of the accident was acquired.3 4
The Dillon court easily did away with years of precedent and
the strong Waube rationale by adopting a policy suggested by
Prosser: "[I] t has properly been said that when a child is en-
dangered, it is not beyond contemplation that its mother will
be somewhere in the vicinity, and will suffer serious shock."38 r
There can be no doubt that Dillon was a major break-
through in the entire area of bystander recovery for traumatic
mental injuries. "Dillon substituted for an inflexible rule
denying all recovery, the policy of determining case-by-case
the merits of each particular action."3 6 The Dillon decision
has been rejected by name in two states which have dealt
31. Id. at 54, 379 P2d at 536.
32. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P2d 912 (1968).
33. Id. at 731, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 751, 441 P.2d at 914.
34. 3 GA. L. Rav. 241, 250-51 (1968).
35. W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW O" TORTS §55, at 353 (3d ed.
1964).
36. 22 S.C.L. Rav. 273, 275 (1970).
1972]
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with similar factual situations.3 7 These rejections indicate
those courts' reluctance to break with the past decisions and
their continued fear of counterfeited claims. The third court
to consider the situation presented in Dillon was important to
the future of this isolated holding, the reason being the stature
of the court'which faced the problem. The Court of Appeals of
New York in the case of Tobin v. Grossmau3U chose not to fol-
low Dillon and stated:
Beyond practical difficulties there is a limit to attaining essential jus-
tice in this area. While it may seem that there should be a remedy for
every wrong, this is an ideal limited per force by the realities of this
world. Every injury has ramifying consequences, like the ripplings
of the waters, without end. The problem for the law is to limit the
legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree. The risks of
indirect harm from the loss or injury of loved ones is pervasive and
inevitably realized at one time or another. Only a very small part
of that risk is brought about by the culpable acts of others. This is the
risk of living and bearing children. It is enough thAt the law establishes
liability in favor of those directly or intentionally harmed.
3 9
This holding in Tobin, by the respected New York court, may
retard the future growth of the trend allowing bystander re-
covery.
The California court upheld its decision in Dillon in the
recent case of Archibald v. Braverman.40 This was the next
case which presented the opportunity to apply the factors set
out in Dillon. The "relationship" test was not a problem since
the plaintiff was the victim's mother. The "nearness" test was
also disposed of, because the plaintiff arrived at the scene
shortly after its occurence. The third, or "observation" test,
presented the court with the greatest problem. The court
determined that the "contemporaneous observance" rule did
not require the plaintiff to actually be present at the scene of
the accident, but only that the shock be "fairly contemporane-
ous" with the accident.4 1 "The extension of protection for
-mental and emotional distress to plaintiffs who only observed
37. Guilmette v. Alexander, 259 A.2d 12 (Vt. 1969) ; Jelley v. La Flame,
108 N.H. 471, 238 A.2d 728 (1968).
38. 24 N.Y.2d 609, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419 (1969)..
39. Id. at 613, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 559, 249 N.E.2d at 424.
'40. 275 Cal. App. 2d 290, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969).
41. Id. at 292, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 725, quoting from W. PROSSER, flADBOOK
OF a E LAW OF TORTS §55, at 354 (3d'ed.' 1964). '
[Vol. 24
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the injuries of the victim and not the accident itself is the real
significance of Archibald.
' 42
Since the Archibald decision, no court has had an oppor-
tunity to accept or reject the California rationale. It can be
seen from these cases that only the slightest breakthrough has
been made, but this beginning is an important one. The South
Carolina court's activity in this area, although limiited, may be
an example of the present posture of many jurisdictions.
V. SOUTH CAROLINA VIEW
The South Carolina "Supreme Court first faced the prob-
lem of whether recovery for mental suffering should be al-
lowed in the case of Mack v. South Bound R. R. 43 In this case,
the plaintiff was not actually struck by the defendant's train,
but guffered mental injury from a near collision. The court
phrased the issue as "whether in an action to recover damages
for an injury sustained through the negligence of another,
there can be a recovery for a bodily injury caused by mere
fright and mental disturbance?" 44 The court in an exhaustive
discussion of this question stated:
The exemption from liability for mere fright, terror, alarm or anxiety
does not rest on the assumption that these do not constitute an actual
injury .... We cannot say, therefore, that such consequences may not
flow proximately from unintentional neligence; and if compensation in
damages may be recovered for a physical injury so caused, it is hard, on
principle, to say why there should not also be a recovery for the mere
mental suffering when not accompanied by any perceptible physical
effects. It would seem, therefore, that the real reason for refusing dam-
ages sustained from mere fright, must be something different, and it
probably rested on the ground that in practice it is impossible satis-
factorily to administer any other rule.4 5
The court, however, decided for the plaintiff simply because
of the seemingly intentional conduct of the defendant-railroad.
The supreme court, in a later opinion, clearly adopted the
"physical injury" requirement for recovery for mental injury.
This case, Norris v. Southern Ry.,46 plainly stated that "the
law in this State does not allow recovery of damages for
mental suffering in the absence of bodily injury, except under
42. 22 S.C.L. Rxv. 273, 276, (1969).
43. 52 S.C. 323, 29 S.E 905, (1898).
44. Id. at 332, 29 S.E. at 908.
45. Id. at 333, 29 S.E. at 909.
46. 84 S.C. 15, 65 S.E. 956 (1909).
19721 NoTEs
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the mental anguish statutes with reference to telegraph com-
panies."
47
Almost fifty years after the Norris decision, the court did
away with the "physical injury" or "impact" test in the case
of Padgett v. Colonial Wlwlesale Distributing Co.48 The court
quoted at length from the California decision of Sloane v.
Southern California Ry. :4
The interdependence of the mind and body is in many respects so close
that it is impossible to distinguish their respective influence upon each
other .... The mental condition, which superinduced the bodily harm
in the foregoing cases was fright, but the character of the mental
excitation by which the injury to the body is produced is immaterial.
If it can be established that the bodily harm was the direct result of
the condition, without any intervening cause, it must be held that the
act which caused the condition set in motion the agencies by which the
injury was produced, and is the proximate cause of such injury.50
The court firmly stated the new rule by holding that "if the
respondent's bodily injury was proximately caused by the
shock, fright, and emotional upset as a result of the negligence
and willfulness of the appellant, he was entitled to recover
such damages as would compensate him for the injuries so sus-
tained." 5 1
The next case in this area comes close to presenting the
third party concept, but does not adequately dispose of the is-
sues. This case, Roscoe v. Grubb,52 distinguished the court's
holding in Padgett in regard to direct causation. The court
stated that in Padgett the plaintiff's fright was a natural, im-
mediate, and foreseeable result of the negligent operation of
the defendant's truck; whereas, in this case the injury was no
more than a trivial bruise which caused no shock, fright, or
emotional upset. The emotional upset was caused not by de-
fendant's negligence, but by plaintiff's concern, at first over
his wife's condition, and then from his fretting over the delay
in settlement of his claims.
47. Id. at 21, 65 S.E. at 959.
48. 232 S.C. 593, 103 S.E.2d 265 (1958).
49. 111 Cal. 668, 44 P. 320 (1896).
50. 232 S.C. 593, 605, 103 S.E2d 265, 271, quoting from Sloane v. Southern
California Ry., 111 Cal. 668, 44 P. 320 (1896).
51. Id. at 594, 103 S.E.2d at 265.
52. 237 S.C. 590, 118 S.E.2d 337 (1961).
[Vol. 24
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The court, in the 1968 decision of Turner v. A B C Jalou-
sie Co.,53 again spoke in terms of foreseeability and proximate
causation. In this case the respondent claimed danger from
shock, fright, and emotional upset caused by the conduct of
appellant. The court, in overruling a demurrer to this cause
of action, stated that:
[S]ince it is alleged in the complaint that the tortious conduct of the
appellant brought about the physical or bodily injury to the respondent,
such states a cause of action and is good against a demurrer. The
question of whether the respondent can prove her case against the ap-
pellant will be determined from the evidence produced upon a trial of
the cause.54
There are unquestionably many states which have prog-
ressed no further on this issue than has South Carolina. The
factual situation has not arisen often, and there has been a
failure on the part of attorneys to plead mental damages due
to old rulings on this subject. The South Carolina courts have
begun to look at traumatic mental injuries as a proper ele-
ment of damages, but, as seen in the Turner and Roscoe cases,
full proof of foreseeability and causation is required.
VI. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS AND STANDARDS
The prior sections have endeavored to show the progress
of the courts in the area of damages for traumatic mental in-
juries and the problems which have been encountered. These
problems will eventually have to be worked out before every
case of mental injury can be fairly and equitably decided.
What solutions and alternatives have been offered to ade-
quately handle this emerging, complex area of damages?
One commentator suggests a solution which can be sum-
marized in the following statement:
The objective standard of the reasonable man has been successfully used
to detect the existence of a breach of duty once a duty has been estab-
lished. The same objective standard could be used to determine the
existence of a duty to a third party observer. Like the reasonable man,
a fictitious person could be created to presuppose an observer's uniform
standard of susceptibility to witnessing injury to a person and to sim-
plify the identification of the prospective standard. The fictitious per-
son could be named the reasonable observer. 55
53. 251 S.C. 92, 160 S.E2d 528 (1968).
54. Id. at 97, 160 S.E2d at 530.
55. Note, Negligently Caused Mental Distress: Should Recovery Be Al-
lowed?, 13 S.D.L. Rav. 402, 408 (1968).
19721
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This author, therefore, would apply traditional negligence con-
cepts to our problem. This approach would require medical
proof of the mental injuries suffered. After the duty and
breach are established, the plaintiff must proceed to prove
that defendant's action was the proximate cause of his dam-
age. This test would reveal any fictitious claim, but in many
cases might pose an unrealistic burden of proof for the plain-
tiff.
This pure negligence approach was first suggested by Dr.
Hubert Smith in his article which discusses the relation of in-
jury and disease to emotional upset. 5 In this celebrated work,
Dr. Smith advocated that liability should be predicated on a
finding that the defendant's conduct caused a substantial and
unreasonable risk of emotional harm to a normal person in the
plaintiff's position. 7 An important truth about the possible
negligence standard is that "the jury reaches the question of
the breadth of the zone of emotional risk in the particular case
as a factual determination, and since the standards with which
it must work are vague, it retains a greater degree of discre-
tion than under the artificial limitations of the traditional ap-
proaches." 58
A similiar approach to this problem has been suggested
by The American Law Institute's Restatement of Torts sec-
tion 436, which reads:
(1) If the actor's conduct is negligent as violating a duty of care de-
signed to protect another from a fright or other emotional disturb-
ance which the actor should recognize as involving an unreason-
able risk of bodily harm, the fact that the harm results solely
through the "internal operation" of the fright or other emotional
disturbance does not protect the actor from liability.
(2) If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable
risk of causing bodily harm to another otherwise than by sub-
jecting him to fright, shock, or other similar and immediate emo-
tional disturbance, the fact that such harm results solely from the
internal operation of fright or other emotional disturbance does
protect the actor from liability.
(3) The rule stated in Subsection (2) applies where the bodily harm
to the other results from his shock or fright at harm or peril to
a member of his immediate family occurring in his presence.5 9
56. Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for
Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. Rlv. 193 (1944).
57. Id.
58. Note, Negligence and the Infliction of Emotional Harm: A Reap-
Praisal of the Nervous Shock Cases, 35 U. CHi. L. Rv. 512, 528 (1968).
59. RESTATE!ENT (SEcOND) OF ToRTs §436 (1965).
[Vol. 24
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The drafters of the restatement, by use of a caveat leave open
the question of whether subsection(3) applies to one not a
member of the plaintiff's immediate family. 60 Also the draft-
ers have left open the question dealing with the necessity for
actually witnessing the injury, but state that if the plaintiff is
a stranger or does not witness the accident, liability may be
denied because of "administrative policy" and "uncertainty
as to genuiness." 61
Prosser states that regardless of what standard is adopted
for deciding whether the plaintiff is to recover or not, there
must be some limitations. 62 "It would be an entirely unrea-
sonable burden on all human activity if the defendant who has
endangered one man were to be compelled to pay for the lacer-
ated feelings of every other person disturbed by reason of it,
including every bystander shocked at an accident, and every
distant relative of the person injured, as well as his friends."6 3
Thereafter, Prosser suggests his limitations which have been
adopted by most commentators and the Dillon and Archibald
courts.
These limitations are basically (1) that the injury must
be a serious one; (2) that the action may be confined to mem-
bers of the immediate family; and (3) that the plaintiff be
present or learn of the accident fairly contemporaneously.
64
Such limitations are unquestionably arbitrary. However, as
stated in Dillon, the hypothetical situations possible are end-
less, and, therefore, each case must be decided as it arises on
its own separate facts.6 5
VII. CONCLUSION
The complex fields of mental anguish and recovery for
traumatic mental injury by the bystander are fairly new areas
of the law. The usual objections based upon a fear of fraudu-
lent claims and the difficulty of proof have been raised
throughout these areas. Many courts have slowly begun to real-
ize that mechanical tests, such as the physical injury and zone
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Comment on Caveat to §436, com-
ment h at 460.
61. Id. at 461.
62. Supra note 9 at 334.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Dillon v. Legg, 69 Cal. Rptr. 82, 441 P2d 922 (1968).
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of danger tests, cannot prevent the incidence of fraudulent
claims. On the contrary, this writer suggests that a pure neg-
ligence standard will protect against these fraudulent claims.
These courts are beginning to realize that the proof problems
are "neither insurmountable nor unique to mental distress
cases, and should not prevent a plaintiff from presenting his
case in court."00
There is a small minority of decisions which has at-
tempted to allow the mentally injured plaintiff-bystander a
forum in which to prove his damages. However, the majority
of the courts continue to disallow such mental injury claims.
The minority decisions have had a positive effect in that they
show that such cases can be proved and that the feared "flood"
of fraudulent claims has not materialized. The major ques-
tion which each court must face is whether its present position
provides the best recompense the law can allow. "Our com-
mon law cannot hope to survive by stubborn adherence to de-
cisions written for a different world. We cannot and should
not apply seventeenth and eighteenth century rules to twen-
tieth century conditions." 7
It is this writer's belief that the aforementioned problems
can be solved when the courts begin to look at the factual sit-
uations of each case and realize that only in those cases in
which traumatic injury can be properly proved should re-
covery be allowed. However, as it has been in the past, most
courts continue to throw out the valid injuries along with the
fraudulent, ones. The choice of direction is now squarely be-
fore the courts. They can no longer hide behind false tests and
procedures. The evolution, although slow and awkward, has
now progressed too far to retreat and hopefully will continue
forward with improvement.
DAVID R. GRAVELY
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